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Repeated games

Date: 10:00 17 November 2016 - 17:00 18 November 2016
Type: Masterclass
Tutor: George Mailath University of Pennsylvania
Venue: Institute for Fiscal Studies
Prices: HE delegates: £75; Charity/Government: £200; other delegates: £450; All prices are exclusive of VAT

Description

The theory of repeated games and reputations provides a central underpinning
for economists’ understanding of social, political, and economic institutions, both
formal and informal. These lectures will survey this theory, explaining what we
have learned, as well as what we have not.

Background: an upper level introductory course in game theory, at the level
of Gibbons (1992) or Osborne (2004).
Course Outline
1. The basic structure of repeated games under perfect monitoring
2. Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
3. Repeated games with private monitoring
4. The basic reputation argument
5. The Canonical Reputation Model and Reputation Effects

References
GIBBONS, R. (1992): Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ.
OSBORNE, M. J. (2004): An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford University
Press, New York.

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